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When Salespeople Manage Customer Relationships:
Multidimensional Incentives and Private Information
Abstract
At many firms, incentivized salespeople with private information about customers are
responsible for CRM. While incentives motivate sales performance, private information can
induce moral hazard by salespeople to gain compensation at the expense of the firm. We
investigate the sales performance--moral hazard tradeoff in response to multidimensional
performance (acquisition and maintenance) incentives in the presence of private information.
Using unique panel data on customer loan acquisition and repayments linked to salespeople from
a microfinance bank, we detect evidence of salesperson private information. Acquisition
incentives induce salesperson moral hazard leading to adverse customer selection, but
maintenance incentives moderate it as salespeople recognize the negative effects of acquiring
low quality customers on future payoffs. Critically, without the moderating effect of maintenance
incentives, adverse selection effect of acquisition incentives overwhelms the sales enhancing
effects, clarifying the importance of multidimensional incentives for CRM. Reducing private
information (through job transfers) hurts customer maintenance, but has greater impact on
productivity by moderating adverse selection at acquisition. The paper also contributes to the
recent literature on detecting and disentangling customer adverse selection and customer moral
hazard (defaults) with a new identification strategy that exploits the time varying effects of
salesperson incentives.

Keywords: salesforce compensation, CRM, private information, adverse selection, moral hazard
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INTRODUCTION
Firms increasingly recognize the value of customer relationship management (CRM) in that
although acquiring customers is important, maintaining customer relationships—and ongoing
revenue streams through higher customer lifetime value— is even more critical for a firm’s
overall profitability (Jain and Singh 2002, Shin and Sudhir 2010, Venkatesan and Kumar 2004).
The academic literature on CRM has typically focused on settings where salaried marketers
balance customer acquisition and maintenance goals using customer databases (e.g., Li, Sun and
Montgomery 2011, Gupta and Lehmann 2005, Zhang, Netzer and Ansari 2014), but have
generally ignored the common setting where firms use incentivized salespeople to acquire
customers and maintain customer relationships.1
There are two major issues when incentivizing salespeople in CRM settings that have not
been addressed in the sales incentives literature. First, we consider the need for multidimensional
performance based incentives that balances sales from both new customer acquisition and
existing customer retention and maintenance. But typical compensation plans that have been
studied in the literature (e.g., Chung, Steenburgh and Sudhir 2014; Misra and Nair 2011) are
only based on a unidimensional measure of performance such as total revenues, which do not
decompose revenues arising from new customers as opposed to maintenance of existing
customers--the core of CRM concepts of customer acquisition and retention.2 Second,
salespeople can have private information on customers, beyond publicly available information
that is also known to the firm, through their relationships with customers. The private
information can help the firm aid in improving customer acquisition and maintenance efficiency,
but it may also be potentially used by salespeople to engage in moral hazard that improves their
own compensation at the expense of the firm.
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Our goal is to investigate the sales performance--moral hazard tradeoff among salespeople
in the use of managerial levers related to multidimensional incentives and private information
when salespeople manage customer relationships. First, the multi-dimensional incentive scheme
rewards salespeople based on joint performance on the acquisition and maintenance dimensions.
While acquisition metrics motivate salespeople to bring in sales through new customers, it also
incentivizes them to commit moral hazard by selectively bringing in easier-to-acquire, poorerquality customers with lower lifetime value. Firms can align salesperson acquisition behavior
and address the moral hazard issue by appropriately weighting performance by customer quality
if quality is observable to the firm (e.g., credit rating), but it is not feasible to do this with private
information. Hence private information can hurt the firm through customer adverse selection.3
Maintenance metrics incentivize salespeople to strengthen and maintain relationships to generate
sales from previously acquired customers (e.g., through ongoing purchases/subscriptions, loan
repayments etc.). But beyond this direct effect, it can also moderate the moral hazard by
indirectly incentivizing forward looking salespeople to ex-ante not acquire bad customers, who
are more difficult to retain (and therefore have lower CLV). By giving salespeople a stake in
future cash flows from customers, maintenance incentives align firm and salesperson payoffs
over the long-term, thus ameliorating the potential customer adverse selection motivation arising
from acquisition incentives.
While the effects of acquisition and maintenance metrics in isolation are intuitive from
the discussion above, their joint effects are harder to characterize. To help fix ideas, we develop
a stylized analytical model of salesperson behavior in response to joint acquisition and
maintenance incentives when they have private information about customers. Two key results
arise. First, we find that given private information, salespeople engage in advantageous customer
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selection when there is high maintenance pressure (i.e. the prospect of existing customers
bringing low profit in the future), and adverse customer selection when maintenance pressure is
low. The result is insightful in that theoretically, maintenance incentives can not only ameliorate
adverse selection, but even reverse it to obtain advantageous selection. What happens in practice
is an empirical question. Second, and not surprisingly, customer maintenance performance
always improves as maintenance pressure increases independent of acquisition incentives.
Second, we consider a lever that a firm can use to control the level of private information
resident in salespeople, given the potential adverse selection effects of private information. One
relevant lever in sales management that helps control the level of private information is periodic
job transfers, that break customer-salesperson ties by relocating the salesperson to a new location
with new customers.4 While this can help the firm by reducing the cost due to adverse selection,
it can also hurt the sales and maintenance efficiency gains from private information. Which of
these effects dominate when there is a transfer is an empirical question.5
The above discussion on how private information and multidimensional incentives
interact to produce a sales performance-moral hazard tradeoff makes it clear that the effect of
multidimensional incentives and private information on customer selection, maintenance and
overall productivity in CRM settings need empirical investigation. Accordingly, the paper
addresses the following research questions relevant to salesforce management in CRM settings:
(1) Do salespeople have private customer information? (2) Do acquisition incentives impact
acquired customers’ unobservable quality, and if so do they lead to advantageous or adverse
customer selection? (3) Do maintenance incentives improve customer maintenance and how does
it impact customer selection? (4) Do transfers that reduce private information improve or hurt the
quality of customer selection and do they hurt or help customer maintenance? (5) Finally, what is
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the net effect of acquisition/maintenance incentives and transfers on overall productivity given
the complex tradeoffs in terms of acquisition and maintenance efficiency, and selection effects?
Answering these questions poses a number of challenges. First, one needs matched panel
data on salesforce incentives/performance and customer relationships over time. This is typically
difficult to obtain, as such data tend to reside separately within different functions of a firm.
Specifically, the sales incentive and performance data reside within human resource/sales
functions within a firm, whereas detailed customer panel data reside within the marketing
function. We use unique panel-data from a microfinance bank in Mexico that lends to small
business customers and allowed us to match the panel data on performance/ compensation/
transfer information about their loan officers (salespeople) with the loan acquisition and
repayment behavior of their customers.
Second, detecting private information is challenging due to its intrinsic unobservability. Our
primary identification strategy leverages the idea that, conditional on public information,
salesforce performance metrics under the incentive scheme should not directly affect future
consumer repayment behavior and profitability of new customers, but only indirectly through
salespeople’s efforts as customers do not observe the metrics. Empirically, we test if there is a
systematic relationship between the salesperson’s performance metrics, based on which the
compensation is paid out, and the IRR of the acquired loans conditional on credit rating, loan
characteristics, and various unobserved demand shifters.
Moreover, our empirical setting allows for exogenous variation in the level of private
information, because the bank randomly transferred their salespeople, severing past relationships
and private information about their customers. The policy is well-designed to be random and
unpredictable so that salespeople cannot indulge in strategic behavior just prior to transfers.6 The
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transfer policy allows us to understand how incentives interact with private information in
producing customer acquisition, maintenance and overall productivity outcomes by comparing
the salespeople’s acquisition and maintenance behavior before and after the transfer.
We find that salespeople possess private information about customers and engage in moral
hazard by using it to maximize their payoffs at the expense of the firm. The key takeaways from
our findings are as follows: First, multidimensional incentives are critical to overwhelm the
negative effects of moral hazard and obtain sales productivity gains in CRM settings.
Salespeople “abuse” private information to acquire lower-quality customers conditional on
observables to perform well on the acquisition metric, but the customer maintenance metric not
only reduces loan defaults (better maintenance), but also indirectly moderates the adverse
selection as forward looking salespeople anticipate the future consequences of current customer
acquisition. It turns out that the overall impact on productivity from acquisition performance
would not be positive without the joint use of maintenance incentives. Second, private
information has positive efficiency enhancing effects, but the negative moral hazard effects on
productivity are larger. When firms reduce private information and salesperson-customer
relational capital using transfers,7 the gain from a reduction in adverse selection is greater than
the loss due to an increase in loan defaults as the relationships between the salesperson and
borrowers is severed. Hence the periodic destruction of private information through transfers is a
useful managerial lever in this setting.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We introduce how this paper is related to
previous literature. Next, we describe institutional details and data. Third, we propose a stylized
analytical model to formalize the idea. Fourth, we explain our empirical strategy and results and
discusses the key findings. Lastly, we conclude and provide future research direction.
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RELATIONSHIP TO THE LITERATURE
This paper contributes to multiple literatures in marketing and economics. As discussed in
the introduction, the CRM literature has not addressed organizational issues of implementing
CRM through an incentivized salesforce, and this paper addresses that important omission, given
the ubiquity of sales force driven CRM across many industries.8
[Insert Table 1 here]
Our primary contribution is to the empirical literature on salesforce compensation, which
we summarize based on the four columns Table 1. First, the existing empirical salesforce
compensation literature (e.g., Chung, Steenburgh and Sudhir 2014; Misra and Nair 2011) either
focuses on the situation where one-shot transactions generate sales or ignore the distinction
between sales arising from new customers and those with existing relationships. This paper adds
to the literature by examining the important case where ongoing customer relationships matter
and therefore important to distinguish between sales from new customers versus sales from
existing customers with whom there is already a relationship. Second, existing empirical
salesforce compensation papers study unidimensional performance metrics. Although there have
been a large number of empirical papers in the field of education and health on the multitasking
agency problem (e.g., Feng Lu 2012, Neal and Schanzenbach 2010) since the seminal theoretical
paper by Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991), to the best of our knowledge, our paper is the first
empirical paper on salesforce compensation that studies a multidimensional compensation
scheme.
Third, our paper introduces the issue of private information of salespeople as a source of
salesperson moral hazard. Existing empirical papers consider salesperson moral hazard around
the issue of sales or effort timing problems in response to nonlinear incentive plans involving
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bonuses and targets at periodic intervals. In contrast, we focus on salesperson moral hazard
arising from the existence of private information on customers, which can lead to adverse
customer selection in customer acquisition and/or delinquency due to inability to collect from
those with whom there is strong relationship. In particular, our analytical model introduces a
stylized framework that helps clarify the joint impact of acquisition and maintenance metrics on
outcomes when there is private information. A key insight is that maintenance metrics can not
only ameliorate adverse selection, but also lead to advantageous selection.
Fourth, our paper considers potential misalignments between a firm and its salesforce
incentives in terms of information that is unobservable to the firm. In Larkin (2014),
misalignment between the firm and its salespeople arises because the firm’s performance metric
does not take into account profit margins even though the firm can observe them, and
salespeople offer excessive price discounts. In Copeland and Monnet (2008), potential
misalignment between the firm and its workers is eliminated because the firm’s performance
metric weighs more the performance on difficult jobs. In these papers, at least conceptually, it is
possible to address misalignment due to differences in true productivity based on observables by
appropriately reweighting contemporaneous variables without concerns for intertemporal effects.
In our paper, the firm faces a misalignment issue due to unobservable (or non-contractible)
information and the nature of the misalignment is intertemporal. The maintenance incentive
addresses the intertemporal misalignment by providing an ongoing stake in future cash flows
from the “customer asset” through an effective “partial ownership” (Grossman and Hart 1986).
Our paper is also related to the literature on social capital in organizations (Sorenson and
Rogan, 2014). As noted earlier, the private information residing within salespeople is a form of
social relationship capital between the firm and its customers—an intangible asset whose
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ownership i.e., control and residual rights resides not with the firm, but with the salesperson
(Grossman and Hart 1986). Recently, Shi et al. (2017) investigate the effect of sales
representative departures on sales in a B2B setting and find that customer reassignment to
different types of salespeople lead to customer churn with 13.2%-17.6% losses in annual sales
for the firm, but this paper does not consider potential adverse selection effects. Canales and
Greenberg (2015) show that these losses may be mitigated by replacing a sales representative
with another who is stylistically similar in their interactions. These papers suggest that the
salesperson-customer relationship is valuable to the firm for customer maintenance. Our paper
shows that while this intangible asset (i.e., private ties that constitute relational contracts) is
useful to firm in retaining and maintaining customers, its impact through salesperson moral
hazard in customer acquisition can be high enough that its periodic destruction through transfers
is profitable to the firm (Fisman, Paravisini and Vig 2011; Canales and Greenberg 2015).
Methodologically, this study contributes to a growing literature that empirically tests for the
existence of private information and distinguishes the effects of customer adverse selection and
customer moral hazard in insurance and credit markets. Note than in our empirical setting, loan
defaults is a form of customer moral hazard. Identifying the existence of private information and
quantifying its effect are challenging because of its intrinsic unobservability. Chiappori and
Salanie (2000) initiated the literature and propose a positive correlation test to detect existence of
asymmetric information in the car insurance market. Subsequent studies test for asymmetric
information in health insurance, by obtaining access to additional information such as preexisting conditions that cannot be lawfully used by insurance companies (Finkelstein and
McGarry 2006, Finkelstein and Poterba 2004) to see if this information explains the type of
insurance plans chosen by the individual and the ex-post health care consumption. The key issue
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is that researchers cannot disentangle whether the poor outcomes arise from ex-ante adverse
selection or ex-post moral hazard by only observing ex-post customer behaviors.9 Past studies
address the issue through a randomized controlled experiment with contract terms (Karlan and
Zinman 2009) or by exploiting policy changes (Dobbie and Skiba 2013). In a contemporaneous
paper, Jeziorski et al. (2016) use the specific institutional rules of the Portuguese auto insurance
market to address adverse selection and moral hazard. Our paper introduces a new identification
strategy that exploits “supply-side” variation in the salespeople’s motivation to use private
information at the point of customer acquisition and a policy that explicitly changes the level of
private information about customers to separate customer adverse selection and customer moral
hazard.

INSTITUTIONAL DETAILS AND DATA
	
  In this section, we describe the institutional details of our empirical setting and then explain
the data used in our empirical analysis.
Institutional Details
Our empirical application is in the context of a Microfinance Institution (MFI) in Mexico
that provides collateral-free loans to low income, small business entrepreneurs through loan
officers (salespeople). The loans are characterized by their small amount (median of $690), high
interest rate (median rate is 85%), short maturity (average length is 6 months) and high
delinquency probability (average of about 25.4%), as is common for microcredit institutions in
emerging markets (see, e.g., Sengupta and Aubuchon (2008) for more discussion on microcredit
loans in emerging markets).
Loan officers have two main responsibilities: acquiring new loans and ensuring repayments
on existing loans. The acquisition stage involves recruiting borrowers through referrals or
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personal visits, accepting loan applications, and recommending loan terms to the bank. The bank
uses public information about the borrower (i.e., a 1-5 credit rating with 5 as best, constructed
with data from an external agency)10 together with information in the loan application to both
approve the loan and set the interest rate. Since a salesperson has a lot of discretion to approve a
loan in our setting, she does not need to have a borrower take further actions if she wants to
accept the loan. After acquisition, officers must ensure that loans are repaid on time (e.g.,
through phone calls and in-person visits). Throughout a loan’s life, loan officers can create
relational capital with their clients and use it to obtain private information about their motives,
needs, financial capabilities/liabilities, and behavior. Salespeople can use such private
information in loan decisions on top of observable variables (e.g., credit rating), because
observables alone may not be sufficient to evaluate borrowers.11 Our interest lies in how loan
officers use this private information to enhance their personal income—either through increased
efficiency in customer acquisition and maintenance that also benefits the firm or through adverse
customer selection, which hurts the firm.12
The salesperson’s compensation in the bank we study has two parts: salary and bonus. The
salary is solely determined by seniority, not performance, while the bonus is a function of
performance on both acquisition and customer maintenance. Acquisition performance is
benchmarked against one’s own past performance to create an acquisition index (Ajt for officer j
at period t is defined by 𝐴!" =

!!"
!
!!"

, where 𝑁!" is the amount of new loans acquired by office j at

!
period t, and 𝑄!"
is the acquisition quota, or the amount of active loans at period t). Maintenance

performance is based on the number and value of loans collected relative to the loans outstanding
!

as a maintenance index (𝑀!" = !"!" where 𝑅!" is the outstanding value of loans that are in good
!"
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standing, and 𝐿𝑉!" is the outstanding value of loans in salesperson j’s portfolio due at period t.
Hence 𝐷!" = 1 − 𝑀!" is the fraction of the value of loans outstanding that is delinquent. The final
bonus is the product of the base salary, acquisition index, and maintenance index (i.e., Bonusjt =
Salaryjt×Ajt×Mjt); thus, receiving zero points in any category would earn them no bonus at all.
Note that the multiplicative feature of the incentive scheme leads officers to balance effort
between acquisition and maintenance in any given time period and introduces a dynamic tradeoff for the salesperson: between the immediate benefits of acquiring (possibly lower quality)
customers to improve acquisition performance, and its future negative effect on maintenance
performance.
Finally, the bank periodically relocates loan officers from their current branch to another
branch. Such transfers are common in the retail banking sector to avoid the potential abuse of
private information by loan officers, which could lead to adverse selection (e.g., Fisman,
Paravisini and Vig 2011). Transferred salespeople take over and monitor the loans acquired by
their predecessors who left the branch. The transferred salesperson’s maintenance bonus does not
depend on the loans she has collected in the previous branch, but solely depends on repayment
outcomes of loans she took over after transfer. A particularly interesting characteristic of the
transfer policy at the MFI is that the transfers, both in terms of timing and location, are entirely
randomly determined. The randomness in timing is intended to prevent loan officers from
engaging in greater adverse selection, when their expectations of transfer are high.13 In the next
subsection, we show that the transfers are indeed randomly determined. It allows us to treat
transfers as an exogenous shock to salesperson private information.
Data
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Our panel data include monthly salesforce performance and compensation data matched
with the transactions on loans generated and maintained by the salespeople. We observe 461 loan
officers working on 129,839 loans for 14 months from January 2009 to February 2010. The loan
data include information on loan characteristics such as the borrower’s credit rating, loan terms
(e.g., amount, interest, origination date and loan duration) and details of loan repayment (e.g.,
monthly payments, delinquency). We do not observe rejected loans, but our empirical analysis
does not rely on such information. Each loan can be matched with the loan officer who
originated the loan, and with the loan officer who is currently maintaining the loan (which is
typically the originating officer, except when there is a transfer). For each loan officer, we have
monthly information on the branch they were assigned to (from which we can infer transfers),
and their score on the acquisition and maintenance benchmarks, which determined their bonus.
[Insert Tables 2a and 2b here]
Table 2a reports summary statistics of loan characteristics and bonus points. The average
loan size is 9,192 pesos (approximately 690 US$ in 2009), with an average loan term of 6
months. The average (annual) interest rate is high at 87% as is typical in many emerging markets
without collateral. The high interest rate reflects both a high overall delinquency rate of
approximately 25.4% and high cost of acquiring and collecting loans.
The average of monthly acquisition points (A) is 0.75 and maintenance points (M) is 0.85;
the average of the overall bonus multiplier (A*M) is 0.59 of the salary. Although we have
significant missing values for the salary information, the average base salary is 4,050 Mexican
pesos ($313 USD). Lastly, the average number of transfers is 0.37, with a maximum of three
transfers over the 14 months we observe.
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Next, we report on the relationship between the bank’s credit rating of borrowers and loan
performance. Recall that the bank’s five-point rating of borrowers (1 least creditworthy to 5 most
creditworthy) is determined by the central office and shared with the loan officers who place the
loan and the loan underwriters who approve the terms of the loan. We confirmed that the
delinquency probability falls and Internal Rate of Return (IRR) of a loan improves as the credit
rating goes up, which indicates that the credit rating is a reliable predictor of borrower quality
and the loan’s risk and performance. Details on how we calculate the IRR can be found in the
Appendix.
Table 2b further explores the relationship between credit rating and loan characteristics.
71% of the loans are given to those with credit rating of 5, 18% to those with credit rating of 4.
Only 11% of loans are given to those with credit ratings of 3 and below. The interest rates are
roughly the same across credit ratings, though the standard deviations are high. This is because
the bank sets interest rates according to a policy where all first-time clients start at the highest
rate, which is gradually lowered if clients maintain a good credit history. In contrast, duration of
the loan is greater for those with lower credit rating, which may be the bank’s attempt to make it
feasible for borrowers with lower incomes to help pay back the loan.
During the observation window, 33.4% of officers had a transfer, and 3.2% had transfers
more than once. To assess the randomness of the transfer policy, we report the results of logistic
regression with transfer as a dependent variable, and observable officer characteristics as
explanatory variables in Table 3. Transfer is not related to any of the officers’ characteristics,
such as tenure, the number of months since their previous transfer, gender, or previous period
performance, confirming the firm’s description of the implementation of the transfer policy.
Transfer is also not correlated with officers’ past performances up to 3 months before transfer, or
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other officer characteristics, such as education level, marital status, relationship type (Canales
2013; Canales and Greenberg 2015) or position in the firm.
[Insert Table 3 here]

ANALYTICAL MODEL
We propose a stylized analytical model of salesperson behavior in response to acquisition
and maintenance incentives as a function of current loan defaults in a salesperson’s portfolio.
The analytical model aims at setting formal structure to clarify the intuition underlying the verbal
arguments laid out in the introduction and then understand the joint effects of acquisition and
maintenance performance metrics on salesperson behavior. Given our focus on salesperson
private information in the empirical analysis, the analytical model abstracts away observables
about borrower quality (e.g., credit scores) and loan heterogeneity (e.g., loan amounts, duration),
that are visible to both the firm and salesperson. Note that abstraction of these factors in the
analytical model is equivalent to controlling for these factors in the empirical analysis (which we
will do).
Customer Primitives
Prospective customers arrive periodically with requests for loans to a salesperson. The
salesperson decides whether to offer a loan or not to each prospective customer given her
incentive payoff and effort cost. There are two types of borrowers; a high type H who has a
higher loan repayment probability (𝑝! ) relative to the low type (𝑝! ), i.e., 0 ≤ 𝑝! < 𝑝! . Further,
we assume that loan delinquency is an absorbing state; i.e., a low type loan once delinquent is
never repaid, i.e., 𝑝! = 0. To reflect the idea that it is easier for salespeople to acquire low type
customers,14 we assume the arrival rate of low type customers 𝜆! is greater than that of the high
type, i.e., 0 < 𝜆! < 𝜆! . We normalize without loss of generality that 𝜆! = 1.
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Salesperson Payoffs: Incentives and costs
The salesperson faces a multidimensional incentive based on acquisition and maintenance
performance. Let B be the bonus, S the salary, A and M are the acquisition and maintenance
metrics of performance. Consistent with our empirical setting, we use the following bonus
function: 𝐵 = 𝑆 ∗ 𝐴 ∗ 𝑀, where A is the number of loans acquired during the period, relative to
one’s quota for number of loans (Q), and M is the fraction of the loan portfolio that is not
delinquent. Without loss of generality, we normalize S and Q to 1.15
Next we describe the cost of effort for acquisition and maintenance for the salesperson. To
reflect the idea that greater effort is required to acquire a scarcer, higher value customer, we
assume that the effort required for acquiring a customer of certain type is inversely proportional
!

to their rate of arrival. Hence the cost of effort for acquiring a high and low type customer is !

!

!

and ! respectively. Therefore if a salesperson acquires 𝑛! high and 𝑛! low type customers, the
!

acquisition effort is given by 𝑒! =

!! 𝑛𝐿
+ .
!! 𝜆𝐿

Let 𝑒! = 𝑚𝑝 be the maintenance effort of a

salesperson to obtain repayment probability of p from the low type that is not delinquent. Note
that given the customer primitives above, maintenance effort cannot affect the probability of
repayment of either the high type or the low type that is delinquent. The cost of effort in any
!

given period is convex in the sum of acquisition and maintenance efforts, i.e.,𝑐(𝑒) = ! (𝑒! +
𝑒! )! .
A key characteristic of the bonus scheme is that the maintenance metric (fraction of
delinquent loans in salesperson’s loan portfolio) induces inter-temporal forward-looking
behavior by salespeople who anticipate how the mix of customers they acquire and the
maintenance effort they incur to avoid delinquency in the present will affect their future
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compensation through its impact on the future delinquency rate. A complete characterization of
the salesperson’s acquisition and maintenance effort choices therefore requires solving a
dynamic program, where the loan portfolio and default rate jointly evolve as a function of the
mix of high and low type loans and the effort choices of the salesperson. Characterizing the
analytic solution to such a dynamic program is non-trivial.
However, our goal of this analysis is more modest; to simply hypothesize whether
acquisition and maintenance efforts are increasing or decreasing as a function of the value of the
maintenance metric at the beginning of the period, i.e., share of delinquent loans in the loan
portfolio. Our analytical strategy is therefore to solve for the salesperson choices for any
arbitrary future continuation values of different loan types for the salesperson, such that their
relative values satisfy constraints that are guaranteed to hold. Specifically let 𝑉! ,𝑉! and 𝑉! denote
arbitrary continuation values of salesperson payoff for a high type, low type and delinquent loan
respectively. Given 1 = 𝑝! > 𝑝! > 𝑝! = 0, the order constraints 𝑉! > 𝑉! > 𝑉! will hold. As a
normalization, we further assume 𝑉! = 0.
Salesperson acquisition and maintenance choices
We now solve for salesperson choices in a period, conditional on the state of her portfolio at
the beginning of the period. We characterize the portfolio in terms of its number of high, low and
delinquent loans. Let h and d be the fraction of high type and delinquent loans respectively and
let k be the total number of loans in the portfolio. Therefore the number of high, delinquent and
low-non delinquent loans in the portfolio are kh, kd, and 𝑘(1 − ℎ − 𝑑) and respectively. Recall
that high types do not become delinquent (i.e., 𝑝! = 1), therefore all delinquencies occur from
the low type.
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As the firm does not observe loan types, but only the level of delinquents, maintenance
incentives are only a function of loans that are delinquent (d). But the salesperson with private
customer information can identify the borrower’s type and acquire or maintain loans
differentially by type. Given all borrowers are otherwise identical, a salesperson’s choice in the
acquisition stage is what fraction of arriving prospective borrowers to accept by borrower type.
We denote the fraction as 𝛼! for high type and 𝛼! for low types. Given the rates of arrival, the
number of borrowers accepted is 𝜆! 𝛼! high types and 𝛼! low types. In the maintenance stage, a
salesperson with private information will only monitor low types who are not delinquent as high
types always repay and delinquent loans never repay. For a monitoring intensity of 𝑝, as
described earlier, the repayment probability of the low type is 𝑝! = 𝑝.
Now we compute the salesperson’s net current period payoff given bonus and cost of effort.
The acquisition metric of performance is the number of acquired loans divided by quota
(normalized to 1) i.e., 𝜆! 𝛼! + 𝛼! . The maintenance metric of performance is the fraction of
loans repaid, i.e., ℎ + (1 − ℎ − 𝑑)𝑝. Given the multiplicative bonus scheme, the salesperson
bonus is (𝜆𝛼! + 𝛼! ) ∗ (ℎ + (1 − ℎ − 𝑑)𝑝). The effort required to acquire 𝜆! 𝛼! + 𝛼! is 𝛼! +
𝛼! . The maintenance effort required to obtain repayment probability p from the low types is
!

given by mp. Thus the total effort given by 𝑒 = 𝛼! + 𝛼! + 𝑚𝑝 and cost of effort is 𝑒 ! .
!

The salesperson with private information chooses acquisition rates by type (𝛼! , 𝛼! ) and
monitoring level p so as to maximize the sum of the current period payoff and the continuation
value of payoffs from existing loans:
𝑐
𝑈(𝛼! , 𝛼! , 𝑝) = (𝜆! 𝛼! + 𝛼! ) ∗ (ℎ + (1 − ℎ − 𝑑)𝑝) − (𝛼! + 𝛼! + 𝑚𝑝)!
2
+[(𝜆! 𝛼! + 𝑘ℎ)𝑉! + (𝛼! + 𝑘(1 − ℎ − 𝑑)𝑝)𝑉! ]
s.t. 0   ≤    𝛼! , 𝛼! , 𝑝   ≤   1
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The solution consists of the optimal acquisition rate by type 𝛼!∗ and 𝛼!∗ , and monitoring level 𝑝∗ .
We now state the key propositions from our analysis. To help understand the effects of private
information, we begin with a benchmark result on customer acquisition for the symmetric
information case, where neither salesperson nor firm has private information.
Lemma: Customer selection in acquisition without private information: When there is no private
!∗

information, the acceptance rate of low type and high type customers will be equal, i.e., 𝛼∗𝐿 =1.
𝐻

!∗

The ratio of number of low to high types among newly acquired customers 𝜆𝛼𝐿∗ will equal the ratio
𝐻

of the arrival rates of the two types

1
𝜆

, irrespective of the level of delinquent loans at the

beginning of the period.
The lemma is intuitive. Without any private information on types, salespeople accept all
customers at the same rate, and their relative share is entirely determined by the arrival rates of
these customers.
Proposition 1: Customer selection in acquisition with salesperson private information
(i) As share of delinquents in the salesperson’s loan portfolio (𝑑) at the beginning of the period
!∗

increases, the ratio of low types to high types among newly acquired borrowers in the period !!!∗

!

decreases till it reaches zero, at which point, only high types are acquired.
(ii) There exists a threshold level of share of delinquent loans in the portfolio 𝑑 ∗ , above which
the ratio of low types to high types among newly acquired customers
symmetric case, i.e.,

!!∗

∗
!!!

<

!
!

!!∗

∗
!!!

is lower than the

, i.e., there is advantageous selection relative to the symmetric
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case. In contrast, below 𝑑 ∗ , there is adverse selection in new customer acquisition, i.e.,
!!∗

∗
!!!

>

!
!

.

Proof: In Appendix.
Figure 1 illustrates the proposition with a numerical example for the case of 𝜆 = 0.4, 𝑘 =
0.45, 𝑐 = 0.65, 𝑚 = 0.01, 𝑉! = 0.25, 𝑉! = 1.625, ℎ = 0.6.

Figure 1a shows that the share of low types

decreases and that of high types increases as 𝑑 goes up. In Figure 1b, there is a threshold level of
𝑑 ∗ at which the share of low to high types crosses the “no private information” share of low to
high types

1
𝜆

, indicating the shift from adverse selection to advantageous selection.

The proposition states that when salespeople have higher maintenance pressure (higher share
of delinquent loans in portfolio), they bring fewer easier to acquire “low type” customers.
Whether private information will lead to adverse selection or advantageous selection will depend
on a threshold level of 𝑑, below (above) which private information leads to adverse
(advantageous) selection in acquisition.
Proposition 2: Ex-post (after acquisition) maintenance effort and loan delinquency
As the share of delinquent loans 𝑑 in the salesperson’s portfolio increases, their maintenance
effort increases. The resulting probability of loan defaults falls monotonically with d, i.e.,

!!∗
!"

>0.

Proof: In Appendix.
The proposition states that as maintenance pressure in the form of higher share of defaults in
loan portfolio increases, salespeople increase their monitoring effort p, and reduce the probability
of loan defaults for the low types 𝑝! . For the same parameters as in the earlier numerical
example, Figure 1c shows that monitoring effort p increases in d.
[Insert Figures 1a, 1b and 1c here]
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EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
We first discuss the identification strategy and then outline steps of the empirical analysis.
Identification Strategy
Given that a salesperson’s private information is inherently unobservable, it is challenging to
demonstrate its presence or identify its effects on salespeople’s performance outcomes. Our
identification strategy relies on two ideas (1) that customers do not observe the salesperson’s
incentive based motivation driving customer acquisition and maintenance efforts and (2)
transfers exogenously change the level of salesperson’s private information about customers.
First, if a salesperson has no private information, the profitability of newly acquired loans
(IRR) should not systematically change with the salesperson’s acquisition performance or
maintenance pressure at the time of acquisition, after conditioning on observable characteristics
such as loan terms and macro shocks. Thus any effect of acquisition performance or
maintenance pressure on customer acquisition helps identify private information.
Second, the transfer policy creates variation in the level of private information among
salespeople with transferred people having less private information or relational capital with their
customers. The randomness in the policy makes this variation exogenous. Therefore, by
comparing the the IRR of newly acquired loans between transferred and continuing officers,
controlling for other observables and fixed effects helps identify the effect of private information
on customer acquisition. Similar comparison of the probability of delinquency of existing loans
helps identify the effect of private information during the maintenance period. Whether the
private information leads to advantageous/adverse selection at customer acquisition or
increase/reduce defaults at the maintenance stage remains an empirical question.
Empirical Strategy
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Our empirical analysis proceeds in three steps. First, we examine selection effects on the
quality of loans due to managerial levers: acquisition/maintenance incentives, and transfers. This
allows us to test for both the existence of private information and empirically assess how multidimensional incentives and transfers impact customer selection. Second, we examine ex-post
repayment/delinquency behavior in response to the managerial levers. Finally, we examine the
effects of the levers on overall salesperson productivity. We complement our main results with
robustness checks. All reported specifications are available in the Web Appendix.
Acquisition: Selection Effects When Originating Loans
We investigate the selection effects during customer acquisition as a function of (1)
acquisition performance, (2) maintenance pressure and (3) transfer state of the salesperson at the
time of origination of the loan (denoted by o). We estimate the following panel linear regression
model
(1)

𝐼𝑅𝑅!"# = 𝛼! + 𝛽! 𝐴!" + 𝛽! 𝐷!,!!! + 𝛾! 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑓𝑒𝑟!" + 𝛾! 𝑋! + 𝜇! + 𝜙! + 𝜖!"#

In equation (1), IRRijo is the internal rate of return of loan i, originated by officer j, at time o.
IRRijo measures loan performance realized after the loan cycle. To eliminate the effects of crosssectional variation across salespeople and focus on intra-salesperson states, we demean
acquisition performance (Ajo) by salesperson average across all periods to obtain Ãjo. Similarly
we demean the fraction of the value of delinquent loans in salesperson j’s portfolio at t (𝐷!" ) by
salesperson average across all periods to obtain 𝐷!" . As we explained in the analytical model, the
maintenance pressure in period o is based on the fraction of delinquent loans at the end of the
previous period o-1, so we include 𝐷!"!! in the regression. The dummy variable Transferjo equals
1 if officer j was new to the branch at the origination period, which we operationalize as working
at the branch for less than a month.16
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The model controls for observable loan characteristics in Xi, such as the borrower’s credit
rating, loan amount, duration, and interest rate. The model also includes loan officer fixed effects
to control for unobserved heterogeneity in salespeople, such as risk-aversion, leniency or effect
of quotas. Lastly, the model has time fixed effects to capture any macro-level shocks, such as
competition against other banks or macroeconomic shocks. We abstract away from potential
concerns of endogeneity in the loan terms for now, but revisit this issue in the robustness checks
section.
We are primarily interested in coefficients β1, β2 and γ1. The coefficients β1 indicates how
unobservable loan quality changes with acquisition performance, controlling for all observable
borrower and loan characteristics. A negative β1 indicates adverse customer selection as the
salesperson seeks out privately known “bad” customers who are easier to acquire to improve
acquisition performance. A positive β2 implies that adverse selection is moderated by the
maintenance incentive and that officers are forward-looking, i.e., officers under high
maintenance pressure screen out unprofitable borrowers at o to prevent a higher delinquency risk
in the future. Lastly, the coefficient γ1 shows the effect of the transfer policy. A positive γ1 shows
that continuing officers acquire worse loans than transferred officers, suggesting that salespeople
with little private information (relational capital) engage less in adverse selection. Note that
transferred and continuing salespeople likely differ in their incentive quotas and information
levels. γ1 indicates the pure effect of change in the level of information due to a transfer, since we
control for their incentive states, 𝐴!" and 𝐷!,!!! in the specification.
[Insert Table 4 here]
Table 4 reports the results. In Model 1, we find that a one-point increase in acquisition
performance relative to the loan officer’s average leads to 0.54% decrease in the IRR of new
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loans. A one-point increase in the maintenance pressure leads to a 1.07% increase in IRR of new
loans. Transferred officers, whose private information is eliminated, bring in higher-quality loans
by 2% of IRR. This shows evidence of private information among the salesforce, that higher
acquisition performance accentuates adverse selection, maintenance pressure mitigates adverse
selection, and transfers also mitigate adverse selection. We additionally examine loan
performance measures beyond IRR, such as the number of late repayments and the failure to
collect a loan on time at least twice during the loan cycle, and found qualitatively similar results.
Those results are available from the authors upon request.
Model 2 adds an interaction term between the two incentive states, while Model 3 includes
quadratic terms for them to capture potential nonlinear effects. The results above remain robust all of the specifications support the hypothesis that the marginal quality of the loan suffers due to
the loan officers’ use of private information to accept riskier borrowers. The coefficients of other
variables are in the expected direction. As observable credit rating increases, IRR goes up.
Smaller loan amounts, longer durations, and higher interest rates are associated with lower
profitability.
Finally, in an unreported specification, we test if transferred salespeople who do not have
private information engage in less adverse selection even as they increase their acquisition
performance. Indeed that interaction effect is positive, supporting the hypothesis.
Maintenance: Ex-post Loan Repayment
Next, we investigate how maintenance pressure and transfers impact ex-post repayment
behavior or delinquency at the maintenance stage. Loan officers under high maintenance
pressure are expected to increase monitoring to reduce defaults on repayment. However,
transferred officers without private information may perform worse on this dimension as they
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have less information to targeting their maintenance effort, where they are most needed. Hence,
we run the following regression.
(2) 𝐷𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦!"# = 𝛼! + 𝛽! 𝐴!" + 𝛽! 𝐷!,!!! + 𝛾! 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑓𝑒𝑟!"
𝐵𝑎𝑑!"!! (𝛼! + 𝛽! 𝐴!" + 𝛽! 𝐷!,!!! + 𝛾! 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑓𝑒𝑟!" ) + 𝛾! 𝑋!" + 𝜇! + 𝜙! + 𝜖!"#
Note that the equations (1) and (2) examine salespeople’s behavior at different stages
(acquisition stage denoted as “o” and maintenance stage is denoted as all subsequent periods
after acquisition, generically denoted by “t”). In Equation (2), Delinquencyijt is a dummy
indicating delinquency of loan i, under loan officer j, at time t. A key part of the maintenance
model in equation (2) is that it separately examines the effects on loans that are already
delinquent at the end of t-1, which is represented by the indicator 𝐵𝑎𝑑!"!! (i.e. 𝐵𝑎𝑑!"!! = 1) and
those that are repaid on time in period t-1 (i.e. 𝐵𝑎𝑑!"!! = 0). We do so because a salesperson’s
monitoring may have greater impact on loans that are not currently delinquent (i.e. 𝐵𝑎𝑑!"!! = 0),
as we find in the data that delinquent loans tend to remain delinquent irrespective of loan officer
actions. We then examine the effect of the maintenance pressure and the transfer policy for each
group of borrowers. The model also controls for loan characteristics through 𝑋!" and officer and
period fixed effects through 𝜇! and 𝜙! , respectively.
The main coefficients of interest are those related to maintenance pressure, which primarily
incentivizes salespeople to ensure repayments on loans. A positive β2 shows that salespeople
under high maintenance pressure increase monitoring intensity to improve borrowers’ repayment
behavior at t. A positive γ1 indicates that the removal of private information when the salesperson
was transferred just prior to period t increases delinquency at t; suggesting that relational capital
and the private information that results from it does help target efforts on the right borrowers and
ensure repayment.
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[Insert Table 5 here]
The estimates are reported in Table 5. Model 1 has only maintenance pressure at t, Model 2
has both acquisition and maintenance states, and Model 3 adds the interaction of the two
components. The coefficient of 𝐷!,!!! is negative and significant in Models 1, 2 and 3, indicating
that maintenance pressure improves monitoring and reduces delinquency of good loans.
Specifically, a one-unit increase in maintenance pressure in period t , leads to a 2% decrease in
the delinquency probability of loans in period t among loans in good standing at t-1. Across
Models 1-3, the coefficient of Transferjt is consistently positive and significant, indicating that
the elimination of private information through transfers prevents effective monitoring and hurts
loan repayment by 0.4%. The negative coefficient of Ãjt in Model 2 indicates that performance on
acquisitions is complementary to that on maintenance due to the multiplicative form of the
incentive structure. A large coefficient on Badi,t-1 suggests that loans that are delinquent are more
likely to remain so. Thus, under high maintenance pressure, officers are less likely to monitor
such loans and more likely to focus on loans currently in good standing. The positive coefficient
of 𝐵𝑎𝑑!,!!! ∗ 𝐷!,!!! suggests that currently delinquent loans receive less monitoring and are
more likely to remain delinquent under high maintenance pressure. We find that transfers have
little effect on bad loans, because continuing salespeople also do not exert significant effort to
maintain those borrowers. We confirm that our results are robust to alternative definitions of Bad
loans.
In sum, combining the findings from the estimates of equations (1) and (2), we find that
private information plays different roles in the acquisition and maintenance stages. In the
acquisition stage, continuing salespeople with private information engage in adverse selection,
which hurts the firm’s profit, evidenced by the positive 𝛾! in equation (1). However, the negative
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𝛾! in the equation (2) shows that their information advantage leads to more effective monitoring

at the maintenance stage, which reduces defaults and increases the firm’s profit.
Salesperson Productivity: Total Net Present Value of Loans Generated
Thus far, we have found evidence of salesperson moral hazard that results in customer
adverse selection due to acquisition incentives. Maintenance incentives mitigate this adverse
selection, and also improve customer repayment. Transfers which reduce private information
reduce adverse selection, but also hurt customer repayment. This is a very rich set of empirical
effects. However, the central question in the use of these levers remains. What is the net effect on
the incentives and transfers, on overall salesforce productivity? For this, we examine whether
the sales-enhancing effect of the incentive levers (e.g., Chung, Steenburgh and Sudhir 2014)
exceeds the negative adverse selection effect due to private information, and whether the positive
effect of transfer (decrease in adverse selection) exceeds the negative effect (ineffective
monitoring). We analyze salesperson productivity at the salespeople-month level rather than at
the loan-level to allow for sales expansion effects.17 In particular, we run the following model in
equation (3).
(3) 𝑁𝑃𝑉!" = 𝛼! + 𝛽! 𝐴!" + 𝛽! 𝐷!,!!! + 𝛽! 𝐴!" ∗ 𝐷!,!!! + 𝛾! 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑓𝑒𝑟!"
+𝛾! 𝑋! + 𝜇! + 𝜙! + 𝜖!"#
The dependent variable NPVjo represents the sum of the net present value of new loans
acquired by officer j at period o. The coefficients β1, β2 and β3 show the effect of incentive
components on the overall quality of loans originated by officer j. The coefficient γ1 shows the
effect of the transfer decision at the point of origination on profits generated by salesperson j.
[Insert Table 6 here]
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Table 6 reports the regression results. Model 1 is the baseline case and the estimates show β1
is positive, β2 positive, and γ1 positive and the effects are all statistically significant. These
results imply that each of the levers considered contribute positively to firm profits. However we
need to consider the interaction between the acquisition and maintenance stages to understand
how these incentives jointly affect profitability. Model 2 adds an interaction term between
acquisition points and maintenance states, illustrated in Figure 2. When the salesperson is under
high maintenance pressure (i.e., those whose previous-period maintenance points are 0.5 point
below their average), the greater acquisition performance leads to a sharp increase in profits, but
when the maintenance pressure is low (0.5 point above their average), an increase in acquisition
points leads to very little increase in profits. In the absence of maintenance pressure, salespeople
engage in significant adverse selection, which neutralizes profits from customer acquisition. In
effect, the firm is paying out commissions with little gains in profitability. However, officers
avoid risky acquisitions under high maintenance pressure, which contributes to the firm’s profits.
This shows that, without the use of maintenance metrics of performance that penalize ex-post
delinquency, salespeople will resort to significant adverse selection and hurt firm profitability.
[Insert Figure 2 here]
Managerial Implications
Our analytical approach and our findings around private information and multidimensional
incentives have important managerial implications for sales force compensation and
management. Our simple regression based approach to evaluate how current incentive plans at an
organization can affect customer acquisition, retention and aggregate salesforce productivity in
the presence of private information can be widely used. We note that while our application is in a
setting of multidimensional incentives where the salesforce is responsible for both customer
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acquisition and retention, the acquisition and productivity regressions can also be used when
salesforces are only incentivized for acquisition, to measure adverse selection effects and the net
productivity effects (sales expansion-adverse selection trade-off) of the incentives.
Next we discuss how our findings provide guidance for salesforce management. First, while
it is well-appreciated by managers that the sales expanding benefits of acquisition incentives are
accompanied by moral hazard costs (salespeople can choose actions for private gain at the
expense of the firm), the conventional wisdom is that the sales expanding benefits should more
than overwhelm the moral hazard costs. Surprisingly, in our application we find that without the
disciplining effects of maintenance metrics on salesforce moral hazard, the overall benefits from
acquisition incentives can be negative because of adverse selection and lack of attention to
retention. This suggests that the cost of salesforce moral hazard and remedies should be
evaluated more seriously by sales management in settings even when only acquisition incentives
are currently offered. In particular, we highlight the role of transfers when feasible as way to
“kill” private information in order to reduce salesperson moral hazard. While our results justify
the oft-employed transfer practices in retail banking,18 we note that the net effects of transfers
will vary across settings. Our approach however provides a general approach for managers to
study the net effects of transfers in other settings.
Second, an often-used remedy for firm-salesforce misalignment is to appropriately weigh
performance metrics to create alignment. For instance, if salespeople discount heavily to win
sales and improve revenue performance, weighing the revenues by margins can create alignment.
But weighting may not always be feasible, and our findings suggest that multidimensional
performance metrics may be the more feasible option to create alignment. For example, in the
context of CRM it is well-known that retention often matters more than even acquisition for firm
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value. While weighting acquired customers by CLV is a possibility, it is often infeasible because
(i) CLV requires forecasts of future retention and revenues, and it may not be feasible to tie
incentives to forecasts and (ii) it is not possible to hold the salesperson responsible for future
retention, once payments have been made based on forecasts. Multidimensional incentives where
incentives balance current acquisition and future maintenance performance are a very effective
managerial solution in these settings without requiring future forecasts.
Finally, our findings have implications for job design in CRM settings. Firms implementing
CRM often use a hunter-farmer model where some salespeople are responsible for customer
acquisition (hunting), while others are responsible for customer maintenance (farming), to take
advantage of the benefits of specialization in skills needed for these two types of activities. Our
results suggest that the gains from specialization may be overwhelmed by the moral hazard at
customer acquisition due to customer adverse selection. Our results suggest that it may be useful
to create teams with joint responsibility for acquisition and maintenance, to benefit from the
gains in specialization,while simultaneously internalizing the potential for moral hazard.

CONCLUSION
This paper aims at addressing the challenges of the sales performance-moral hazard tradeoff arising when salespeople manage customer relationships. We consider the role of
multidimensional incentives that are based on joint acquisition and maintenance metrics and that
of private information. A stylized analytical model of salesperson behavior in CRM settings
helps us understand how the acquisition and maintenance jointly impact outcomes when there is
private information. We then exploit unique matched panel data on customers and salespeople at
a microfinance organization to empirically analyze how these sales management levers impact
CRM outcomes. Managerially, our study illustrates how firms managing CRM can assess the
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effect of their performance metrics and compensation plans on customer acquisition, retention
and overall productivity. This approach can be used even firms only use acquisition performance
incentives by estimating only the customer acquisition and productivity regressions.
Methodologically, the paper also introduces a new identification strategy to detect and
disentangle customer adverse selection and customer moral hazard that has been a major issue in
credit and insurance markets, by exploiting time-varying effects of loan officer incentives and
job transfers.
We believe this paper is a first step to address a rich set of research issues at the intersection
of CRM and sales management. We conclude with some suggestions for future research. First,
we considered a setting involving customer acquisition for loans and ongoing repayment for the
loan’s life. Insurance settings are similar in that they also involve customer acquisition of
insurance policies and ongoing premium payments over the life of the policy. But other common
settings do not have clear maintenance outcomes--for example CRM often involves cross-selling
of products, increasing the share of a customer’s wallet etc. Further research is needed on how
firms should incentivize salespeople on such CRM related metrics.
Second, substantive research on multidimensional incentives is still scarce. While
multidimensional incentives involve balancing short-run and long-run considerations with
acquisition and maintenance incentives in our paper, firms may want to align employee
incentives by weighing competing contemporaneous considerations (e.g., lowering service time
and increasing satisfaction) in other settings.
Third, in finance, transfers are commonly used as a means to render the salesperson’s
relational capital unusable and thus minimize negative effects of adverse selection in customer
acquisition. However, this can potentially hurt the efficiency gains from the ongoing
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relationship. Canales and Greenberg (2015) find that much of the potential loss of repayment of
loans may be averted by replacing salespeople with others who have a similar relational style,
suggesting that there may be a way to reduce customer adverse selection through transfers, while
avoiding the increased loan defaults through continuity in salespeople styles. More generally,
while we find that transfers have a net benefit for the bank, Shi et al. (2017) find in their setting
that customer reassignment to salespeople (equivalent to transfers) can lead to significant loss
churn in the context of electrical product retailer. However, Shi et al. does not consider the
adverse selection issue. Future research may investigate how the relative importance of adverse
selection vs. efficiency from private information varies across industries and how managers can
balance them.
Finally, our results should motivate more research on sales person job design in CRM
settings. While in bank and insurance settings, salespeople are responsible for both customer
acquisition and maintenance, many organizations and industries follow a specialized hunterfarmer model (Palmatier et al. 2007) with different employees responsible for customer
acquisition (hunt) and customer retention/maintenance (farm). In such cases, we suggest that to
the extent possible, a CLV weighted metric of performance should be used to incentivize
hunters, while the farmers be incentivized on maintenance metrics. Alternatively, one may
construct teams that are responsible for both acquisition and retention, thus gaining both
specialization benefits while reducing the cost of moral hazard. But more broadly, our research
suggests that when designing organizations for CRM, we need to balance the efficiency gain
from specialization in acquisition and maintenance activities, with the potential adverse effects
that we identify arises from the separation of those tasks.
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ENDNOTES
1. Related papers at the sales management-CRM interface include (1) Kumar, Sunder and Leone
(2014), who propose a metric to compute salesperson lifetime value based on CLV managed by
each salesperson, and (2) Palmatier et al. (2007) and Shi et al. (2016) who study the linkages
between salesperson turnover and customer loyalty. These papers do not address incentive
issues.
2. A natural question is whether one could use aggregate CLV aggregate CLV of a salesperson’s
acquired customers in a period as unidimensional metric to determine incentives. Two practical
challenges arise. First, CLV requires forecasting future revenues of customers, but incentive
contracts based on forecasts is often infeasible. Further, the salesperson has little incentive to
deliver the forecast CLV by retaining customers after having received the incentive.
3. The issue of adverse selection in response to sales incentives has received much media
attention in in the context of the subprime mortgage crisis. Loan officers in banks were accused
of approving mortgages to customers with less than stellar credit, by disguising their lack of
creditworthiness in order to receive loan acquisition bonuses as they were not responsible for
subsequent performance. Adverse selection is also critical in other marketing settings where
firms invest substantially in customer acquisition and hope to recover the benefits of their
investments over the life of the relationship. If a salesperson knowingly acquires customers who
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are likely to leave soon before the acquisition costs have been recouped, such acquisitions can
hurt firm value.
4. Employee transfer is a common practice in the B2B finance sector. France, Germany, and the
U.S., for example, mandate rotation of audit partners across clients. See discussion in Fisman,
Parvasini and Vig (2011) on mandated transfers in the Indian state banking sector.
5. Firms typically do not have levers either contractually or through incentives to appropriate
this asset from the salesperson so that the firm can avoid the adverse selection. For instance,
although firms encourage salespeople to input information about their ongoing conversations
with prospects and stage of conversion in CRM tools, salespeople are reluctant to part with this
information, which they view as their own assets for which they receive no rewards for sharing.
6. Hertzberg, Liberti, and Paravisini (2010) find that loan officers are more likely to make
negative reports on borrowers’ ability to repay, when anticipating transfers. The randomization
of transfers in our setting excludes the possibility of such strategic behavior by officers.
7. We do not distinguish between private information and relational capital. Both are established
as a salesperson interacts with potential customers and existing customers (borrowers) over time,
at the time of loan application, screening, monitoring and repayment. Thus we treat transferred
salespeople as those who lost both private information and relational capital.
8.

Reinartz, Krafft and Hoyer (2004) consider issues of organizational alignment in

implementing CRM, but do not consider salesforce incentive issues.
9. The relationship between loan officers’ incentives and their screening/monitoring behaviors
have been studied in finance (Agarwal and Ben-David 2014; Cole, Kanz and Klapper 2015;
Heider and Inderst 2012; Hertzberg, Liberti and Paravisini 2010). They mention problems with
unidimensional incentives but do not formally address the balance between multiple tasks.
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10. Loan officers cannot change credit ratings, nor do they advise customers about how to
improve credit ratings. Since a salesperson has significant discretion in approving the loan in our
setting, she does not need to make a borrower to take further action to recommend the loan.
11.

Based on interviews, Canales (2013) notes that salespeople do not completely trust

observables, and tend to act based on private information. We quote from two interviews: (1)
“You (a loan officer) go through the entire analytic process and, at the end, if you trust the client
and believe in her, you give her the loan. Maybe the liquidity index will not be enough
[according to the rules] but if you believe in her, you will “help her out” and you will take the
risk with her.” and (2) “They (officers) have access to information on each of their clients. They
can use that information to determine the moral and economic solvency of new prospects, to
detect when a client is in trouble, and to be more effective when they need to collect. They have
seen what works and what doesn’t. They know who does what and who knows who. When
officers use that information to benefit a client, they can make a big difference.”
12. Our data allows us to study repayment behavior within a loan, but we lack sufficiently long
panel data to study customer retention and repayment behavior across loans. Further,
maintenance incentives are only for repayment. Therefore we only consider repayment within
the loan as maintenance.
13. As salespeople are given less than one week to start work at the new location after a transfer
it is hard for them to change their behavior or share private information to incoming salespeople.
14. This is because observably high type customers have more outside options due to greater
competition for their business (see Jeziorski et al. 2016 for such evidence in car insurance
market).
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15. We check the robustness of our hypotheses for an additive bonus function and find them to
be qualitatively robust in the Web Appendix.
16. We use the one month operationalization for “newness to branch” because: 1) given short
loan cycles, salespeople seek to elicit as much information as possible in a short time and 2)
salespeople work for 14-15 hours a day, thus typically get to know their customers within the
month. Our results are robust to alternative operationalizations of newness.
17. The total NPV metric is similar in spirit to the Salesperson Lifetime Value Metric in Kumar,
Sunder and Leone (2015) at the salesperson-month level, but with ex-post known (as opposed to
forecast) values of future customer cash flows.
18. We note that the effects of transfers can vary by context, by the specifics of the transfer
policy used, and the nature and use of private information in that context. Like in our paper, Shi
et al. (2017) show that transfers break the relationship between employees and customers and
increase customer churn rate, but it is possible that the adverse selection costs of private
information may be weaker in other settings.

41

Table 1. Previous Literature on Salesforce Compensation

Paper

Transaction/
Relationship

Performance
Metric
Uni/Multi
dimensional

Salesperson Moral Hazard
(Hidden action)

Firm/Agent
Misalignment as
performance metric
not weighted by
observables

Oyer (1998)

Transactional
(Sales)

Unidimensional:
Annual revenue
targets

Moral Hazard: Find evidence
that sales timing shifts to reach
quota

Misra and
Nair (2011);
Kishore,Rao,
Narasimhan
and John
(2013)

Transactional

Unidimensional:
Quarterly revenue
targets with
ratcheting

Moral Hazard: Find evidence
that sales timing shifts to reach
quota

Chung,
Steenburgh
and Sudhir
(2014)

Transactional

Unidimensional:
Quarterly and
annual revenue
targets with nonratcheting quotas

Moral hazard: Finds evidence
that sales timing shifts to reach
quota, but can be minimized
through overachievement
commission and non-ratcheting
quotas

Larkin
(2014)

Transactional

Unidimensional:
Annual revenues

None

Misalignment:
Salespeople discount
price as performance
metric does not
account for observable
margins

Copeland
and Monnet
(2008)

Transactional

Unidimensional:
No of checks
sorted daily as a
weighted function
of task difficulty

Moral Hazard: Find evidence
that effort timing shifts based on
distance to quota

Reduce misalignment
within periods:
Weighting observable
job difficulty leads to
right effort allocation
within day

This paper

Relationship
(distinguish
new and
existing
customers)

Multidimensional:
Function of
monthly loan
acquisition and
loan repayment

Moral hazard: due to customer
private information
* Advantageous/Adverse
customer selection?
* Customer maintenance?

Reduce misalignment
across periods: Future
maintenance concerns
discourage easier, low
quality (low credit
rating) customer
acquisition
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Table 2a. Summary Statistics
Loan Characteristics
Amount (pesos)
Annual Interest rate (%)
Duration (months)
Delinquency (%)
Salesforce Incentives and Transfer
Acquisition Point (𝐴)
By Salesperson-period
Maintenance Point (𝑀)
𝐴∗𝑀
By Salesperson
No. of Transfers

Mean
9,192
87.21
6.27
25.42
Mean
0.75
0.85
0.59
0.37

SD
8,956
8.81
3.89

Min
700
42
1

Max
55,000
100.29
33

SD
0.45
0.23
0.3
0.55

Min
0
0

Max
3.188
1.25

0

3

Table 2b. Distribution of Loan Performance and Characteristics across Credit Rating
IRR

Credit
Rating

N

1
2
3
4
5

4,484
3,089
6,754
23,768
91,744

Mean
45.9
53.36
66.98
79.16
87.28

Delinquency prob.
SD
44.57
39.46
35.63
23.96
19.66

Mean
0.65
0.59
0.46
0.25
0.14

SD
0.36
0.38
0.38
0.3
0.22

Interest rate

Duration

Mean

SD

Mean

SD

88.67
86.71
88.1
86.27
87.58

9.83
9.58
8.46
7.25
9.13

10.76
10.84
8.43
6.13
5.84

6.38
6.89
4.41
3.77
3.38

Table 3. Randomness of Transfer Policy1
Model 1
DV

𝐴!!!

Model 2

Model 3

Model 4

Model 5

-0.251
(0.203)
0.342
(0.387)

-0.294
(0.206)
0.429
(0.406)
-0.00199
(0.00139)

Tenure

0.368
(0.241)

Female
Time since
Last Transfer

Period FE
N
1

Model 7

𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑓𝑒𝑟! 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑓𝑒𝑟! 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑓𝑒𝑟! 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑓𝑒𝑟! 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑓𝑒𝑟! 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑓𝑒𝑟! 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑓𝑒𝑟!

𝑀!!!

Intercept

Model 6

-2.897***
(0.304)
Yes
2,603

-3.505***
(0.452)
Yes
2,646

-3.218***
(0.439)
Yes
2,590

-2.716***
(0.152)
No
3,224

-3.440***
(0.182)
No
1,947

0.151
(0.0957)
-4.284***
(0.486)
No
696

We run logistic regression (DV: Transfer, Indicator 1 if an officer is new to the branch at period t).

-0.0195
(1.199)
-1.771
(2.916)
0.00960
(0.00850)
1.645
(1.047)
0.357
(0.282)
-6.338*
(3.493)
Yes
150
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Table 4. Internal Rate of Return (IRR) of Newly Originated Loans
DV
𝐴!"   
𝐷!,!!!

Model 1
IRR
-0.537***
(0.152)
1.070**
(0.538)

𝐴!" ∗ 𝐷!,!!!

Model 2
IRR
-0.540***
(0.152)
1.059**
(0.538)
-0.556
(1.382)

1.987***
(0.216)
3.991***
(0.598)
13.33***
(0.476)
21.74***
(0.420)
26.66***
(0.404)
0.630***
(0.0790)
-0.108***
(0.0202)
0.657***
(0.00703)
-10.95***
(1.231)

1.984***
(0.216)
3.991***
(0.598)
13.33***
(0.476)
21.74***
(0.420)
26.66***
(0.404)
0.630***
(0.0790)
-0.108***
(0.0202)
0.657***
(0.00703)
-10.97***
(1.232)

-0.556**
(0.244)
1.037
(1.851)
1.988***
(0.216)
3.995***
(0.598)
13.33***
(0.476)
21.75***
(0.420)
26.66***
(0.404)
0.629***
(0.0790)
-0.108***
(0.0202)
0.657***
(0.00703)
-10.87***
(1.233)

Yes

Yes

Yes

(𝐴!" )!
(𝐷!,!!! )!
𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑓𝑒𝑟!"
Rating 2
Rating 3
Rating 4
Rating 5
Loan
Amount
Duration
Interest Rate
Intercept
Salesperson,
Period FE
N

Model 3
IRR
-0.645***
(0.159)
0.970*
(0.567)

89,993
89,993
: p<0.01, **: p<0.05, *: p<0.1

***

89,993
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Table 5. Delinquency of Existing Loans
DV
𝐷!,!!!
𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑓𝑒𝑟!"
𝐵𝑎𝑑!,!!!
𝐵𝑎𝑑!,!!! ∗ 𝐷!,!!!
𝐵𝑎𝑑!,!!! ∗ 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑓𝑒𝑟!"

Model 1
Delay
-0.0201***

Model 2
Delay
-0.0203***

Model 3
Delay
-0.0203***

(0.00763)

(0.00764)

(0.00778)

0.00448*

0.00442*

0.00442*

(0.00257)

(0.00257)

(0.00257)

0.470***

0.470***

0.470***

(0.00198)

(0.00198)

(0.00198)

0.0954***

0.0957***

0.0957***

(0.0128)

(0.0128)

(0.0129)

-0.00403

-0.00376

-0.00377

(0.00390)

(0.00390)

(0.00391)

-0.00440**

-0.00441**

(0.00178)

(0.00180)

0.000994

0.000999

(0.00321)

(0.00322)

𝐴!"
𝐵𝑎𝑑!,!!! ∗ 𝐴!"

-0.000431

𝐴!" ∗ 𝐷!,!!!

(0.0169)
0.000603

𝐵𝑎𝑑!,!!! ∗ 𝐴!" ∗ 𝐷!,!!!
Rating 2
Rating 3
Rating 4
Rating 5
Loan Amount
Duration
Interest Rate
Age of Loan
Intercept

(0.0300)
-0.00468

-0.00468

-0.00468

(0.00415)

(0.00415)

(0.00415)

-0.0720***

-0.0720***

-0.0720***

(0.00351)

(0.00351)

(0.00351)

-0.165***

-0.165***

-0.165***

(0.00314)

(0.00315)

(0.00315)

-0.253***

-0.253***

-0.253***

(0.00301)

(0.00301)

(0.00301)

-0.00482***

-0.00483***

-0.00483***

(0.000718)

(0.000718)

(0.000718)

0.00162***

0.00163***

0.00163***

(0.000180)

(0.000180)

(0.000180)

0.00212***

0.00212***

0.00212***

(0.0000686)

(0.0000686)

(0.0000686)

0.0113***

0.0113***

0.0113***

(0.000299)

(0.000299)

(0.000299)

0.126***

0.126***

0.126***
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Salesperson, Period FE
N
***

(0.0112)

(0.0112)

(0.0112)

Yes
278,943

Yes
278,943

Yes
278,943

: p<0.01, **: p<0.05, *: p<0.1

Table 6. Total NPV of Originated Loans by Salesperson by Month
Model 1
𝑁𝑃𝑉!"
2.390***
(0.264)
-0.205
(0.924)

Model 2
𝑁𝑃𝑉
DV
!"
2.410***
𝐴!"   
(0.264)
-0.000635
𝐷!,!!!
(0.930)
4.403*
𝐴!" ∗ 𝐷!,!!!
(2.431)
0.928***
0.941***
𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑓𝑒𝑟!"   
(0.323)
(0.323)
4.957***
5.058***
Intercept
(1.885)
(1.885)
Salesperson FE
Yes
Yes
Period FE
Yes
Yes
N
3,403
3,403
***
: p<0.01, **: p<0.05, *: p<0.1
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Figure 1a. Acceptance rate by Type under Private Information

Figure 1b. Relative acceptance rate (Low/High) under Private information vs. No information

Figure 1c. Monitoring Intensity under Private Information

*

Optimal behavior under 𝜆 = 0.4, 𝑘 = 0.45, 𝑐 = 0.65, 𝑚 = 0.01, 𝑉𝐿 = 0.25, 𝑉𝐻 = 1.625, ℎ = 0.6
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Figure 2. Profit under High vs. Low Maintenance Pressure
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APPENDIX
Details on Compensation Plan
We describe the specifics of how acquisition and maintenance points are calculated for the
purposes of compensation. Tables A.1 describes how a sales person’s target for a month is set
based on the portfolio size of the previous month. Acquisition point (A) is the ratio the value of
newly acquired loans to acquisition target as defined in Table A.1. Table A.2 describes the
nonlinear mapping from percentage of loan amount in good standing to maintenance points.
[Insert Tables A.1 and A.2 here]
Formal Analytical Model
We provide the details of the analytical model. We solve for the optimal action for a
salesperson to maximize the objective function. Only the interior solutions are presented here but
the corner solutions (0 or 1) are applied under some conditions.
𝛼!∗ =

1
[(1 − ℎ − 𝑑)! (𝑉! 𝜆 + 𝑉! (𝑐𝑘(1 − 𝜆) − 𝜆)) − 𝑐𝑚(ℎ! (1 − 𝜆)
𝑐(1 − ℎ − 𝑑)! (1 − 𝜆)!

+(𝑐 + 2(1 − 𝑑))𝑉𝐻 𝜆 − 𝑐𝑉𝐿 − (1 − 𝑑)(1 + 𝜆)𝑉𝐿 − ℎ(1 − 𝑑 + 𝑐(1 − 𝜆) − 𝜆(1 − 𝑑) + 2𝑉𝐻 𝜆
−𝑉! (1 + 𝜆))) + 𝑐 ! 𝑚 ! (𝑉! 𝜆 − 𝑉! − ℎ(1 − 𝜆))]

𝛼!∗ =

1
[−(1 − ℎ − 𝑑)! (𝑉! 𝜆! + 𝑉! (𝑐𝑘(1 − 𝜆) − 𝜆! ) + 𝑐𝑚𝜆((1 − ℎ
𝑐(1 − ℎ − 𝑑)! (1 − 𝜆)!
− 𝑑)(𝑉! (1 + 𝜆)

−ℎ(1 − 𝜆) − 2𝑉! ) − 𝑐(ℎ(1 − 𝜆) − 𝑉! 𝜆 + 𝑉! )) + 𝑐 ! 𝑚! (−𝑉! 𝜆 + 𝑉! + ℎ(1 − 𝜆))
𝑝∗ =

𝜆(𝑉! + ℎ) − (𝑉! + ℎ)
(1 − 𝜆)(1 − ℎ − 𝑑)

Proof of Proposition 1.
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!

!∗

( ! ) < 0 when 𝑑 <
!" !! ∗
!

(!!!)!! (!! !!! )! !! (!! !!!! !!(!!!))(! !(!!!)!!! ! (!!!)(!!!)!!(!!!))
!
!  !  !  !! (!!!)     !  (!!! !! !!! !!! (!" (!!!)!!!)!(!! !!"!!! (!!!)))
!

!

(𝑐 ! 𝜆! (1 − 𝜆) (𝑉! − 𝑉! )! (ℎ(1 − 𝜆) − 𝑉! 𝜆 + 𝑉! )! (1 − 𝑚) + 𝑐 ! 𝑘𝑉! 𝑚(1 − 𝜆)! (ℎ(1 − 𝜆) − 𝑉! 𝜆 + 𝑉! )! (1 − 𝑚))!
+
!
𝑐  ℎ  𝑘  𝑉! (1 − 𝜆)      +    (1 − 𝜆)(𝑉!! 𝜆! − 𝑉! 𝜆𝑉! (𝑐𝑘 (1 − 𝜆) + 2𝜆) − (𝜆! + 𝑐𝑘𝑉!! (1 − 𝜆)))
!!∗

∗
!!!

𝑑<

1

∗
> (e.g. adverse selection) or 𝛼!
< 𝛼!∗ when
𝜆

1
[2𝜆(1 − ℎ)(1   +   𝜆)(𝑉! − 𝑉! ) + 𝑐𝑘𝑉𝐿 (4  (1 −   ℎ)(1 − 𝜆)
2𝜆(1 − 𝜆)(𝑉! − 𝑉! ) + 4𝑐𝑘𝑉! (1 − 𝜆)

+ (  ℎ  (1   + 𝜆! )
+(1 + 3  𝜆)𝑉𝐿 − 𝑉𝐻 𝜆  (3 +   𝜆))𝑚) + 𝑐𝑚(𝑚(8(𝑉𝐻 𝜆 − 𝑉𝐿 − ℎ(1 − 𝜆))(𝑉𝐻 𝜆(1 + 𝜆)   
+𝑉! (2𝑐𝑘(1 − 𝜆) − 𝜆(1 + 𝜆)) + (1 − 𝜆)(𝑉! ! 𝜆! (1 − 𝜆) + ℎ! (1 − 𝜆)(1 + 𝜆)! − 2𝑉! 𝑉! 𝜆(1 − 𝜆 − 8𝑐𝑘)

−(1 − 𝜆 + 16𝑐𝑘)𝑉𝐿 2 + 2ℎ𝑉𝐿 (1 − 𝜆)(𝑉𝐻 𝜆(1 + 𝜆) + (1 + 𝜆 + 8𝑐𝑘)))1/2 ]
!!∗

∗
!!!

1

∗
< (e.g. advantageous selection) or 𝛼!
> 𝛼!∗ when 𝑑 is greater than the threshold.
𝜆

Proof of Proposition 2.

!!∗
!"

=

!(!! !! )!(!! !!)

(!!!)(!!!!! )!

> 0 since 𝜆(𝑉! + ℎ) − (𝑉! + ℎ) > 0

Table A.1: Compensation Plan – Acquisition Target
Portfolio Size

01/09 – 06/09

07/09 – 02/10

0 – 500,000

50,000

60,000

70,000

80,000

90,000

100,000

500,001 1,000,000
1,000,001 –
1,500,000

Portfolio Size
1,500,001 –
2,000,000
2,000,000 –
2,500,000

01/09 – 06/09

07/09 – 02/10

110,000

120,000

130,000

140,000

2,500,001 -

150,000

160,000

Table A.2: Compensation Plan – Maintenance Point
% loan amount in
good standing
0 - 87.5%
87.5 - 88.5%
88.5 - 90%
90 - 92.5%
92.5 -93%

Point
0
0.5
0.6
0.65
0.7

% loan amount in
good standing
93 - 93.5%
93.5 - 94%
94 - 94.5%
94.5 - 96%
96 - 96.5%

Point
0.75
0.8
0.85
0.9
1

% loan amount in
good standing
96.5 - 97%
97 – 97.5%
97.5 - 98%
98 - 99%
99 - 99.5%
99.5 - 100%

Point
1.05
1.08
1.1
1.15
1.2
1.25
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Web Appendix (Not for Publication)
Further evidence on the randomness of transfer policy
In the main text, we argue that transfer decisions are completely random, verified by
interviews with the firm and our analysis in Table 3 in the paper. In this section, we additionally
confirm that the transfer decisions are not correlated with the average loan amount that each
salesperson gives out, or the interaction between time since the last transfer and previous
period’s maintenance performance. The result reported in Table WA1 shows that no coefficient
is significant at the 10% level and verifies the randomness of transfer policy.
[Insert Table WA1 here]
Duration of the Effect of Transfer
In the main text, we assume a salesperson as new to the branch, if he has worked for the
branch for less than a month. Our assumption stems from the fact that 1) loan cycles are very
short (i.e. 6 months on average), thus salespeople tend to try to elicit much information about
customers in a short time and 2) salespeople typically work for 14-15 hours per day, thus might
have enough time to get to know a new set of customers in a month.
In order to see how long it takes for a salesperson to get familiar with her new area, we
check another definition of “new” loan officers. The variable 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑓𝑒𝑟!" is defined as the
dummy variable indicating that a salesperson j has been in the branch for less than two months as
of the period o. In Table WA2, we find that at the acquisition stage, the effects of 𝐴!" and 𝐷!,!!!
remain qualitatively consistent, but the Transfer effect becomes statistically insignificant. As we
argued earlier, we believe that 2-months is already a very long time in this setting, considering
the loan cycle and salespeople’s working hours. Thus, the new definition dilutes the effect of
transfer policy that gets rid of private information from salespeople.
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[Insert Table WA2 here]
Table WA3 reports our analysis at the maintenance stage. The variable 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑓𝑒𝑟!" is
defined as the dummy variable indicating that a salesperson j has been in the branch for less than
two months as of the period t. As in the main analysis in the paper, we find the negative
coefficient of 𝐷!,!!! , implying the maintenance pressure ramps up monitoring intensity and
reduces loan defaults among loans in good standing in the previous period (i.e. 𝐵𝑎𝑑!,!!! = 0).
Also, the transferred salespeople do less effective monitoring, but the magnitude of the effect
gets smaller. The coefficient of 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑓𝑒𝑟!" in Table 5 is 0.00442, whereas the coefficient goes
up to 0.00541 with the new definition. All other coefficients remain qualitatively consistent with
our main analysis documented in Table 5 in the paper.
[Insert Table WA3 here]
Analytical Model Under Additive Incentive Scheme
In our empirical context, the bank uses a multiplicative compensation scheme, where
acquisition and maintenance performance indices are multiplied to compute bonuses.
Accordingly, our hypotheses in the main paper were based on a model using a multiplicative
compensation structure. We now assess whether our hypotheses will continue to hold an additive
compensation scheme, by changing the compensation scheme in Section 3.
All assumptions and notation remain the same as in Section 3. The only change is that we
the total bonus is now based on the sum of acquisition and maintenance performance. The
salesperson maximizes the sum of the current period’s bonus and her loans’ continuation value,
considering the acquisition and monitoring costs, as she does under the multiplicative incentive
scheme.
𝑐
𝑈(𝛼! , 𝛼! , 𝑝) = (𝜆! 𝛼! + 𝛼! ) + (ℎ + (1 − ℎ − 𝑑)𝑝) − (𝛼! + 𝛼! + 𝑚𝑝)!
2
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+[(𝜆! 𝛼! + 𝑘ℎ)𝑉! + (𝛼! + 𝑘(1 − ℎ − 𝑑)𝑝)𝑉! ]
s.t 0   ≤   𝛼! , 𝛼! , 𝑝   ≤   1
We solve for the optimal solution of acquisition rate by type 𝛼!∗ and 𝛼!∗ , and monitoring level for
low type 𝑝∗ . The solutions are provided below.
𝑝∗ = (𝑚(1 + 𝑉! ) − (1 − ℎ − 𝑑)(𝑘𝑉! + 1))/(𝑐𝑚(𝑚 − 1))
𝛼!∗ + 𝛼!∗ = (𝑉! (𝑘 − 1) − (𝑘𝑉! + 1)(ℎ + 𝑑))/𝑐(𝑚 − 1)
Both the hypotheses from the Analytical Model section, continue to remain valid.
Details on Calculating Internal Rate of Return
In this section, we explain how to calculate the internal rate of return (IRR), which is a key
outcome variable in our main empirical analysis. The IRR of each loan is calculated based on
loan size and returned amount over time. Our data do not include exact cash inflow; thus, we
make the following assumption on the returned amount: a borrower decides to make zero
repayment in the delinquent period and make full repayment in other periods. A loan officer
cannot collect any amount from the period in which the loan defaults. IRR of loan i is defined as
the rate that makes the loan’s NPV zero.

Here, Cit is cash inflow in the period t (either full amount to be repaid, or zero amount), Cio
is loan size, r is the interest rate and T is the number of time periods to be considered. If a
borrower does not default, T is equal to the loan’s maturity, otherwise T is the number of periods
before default.
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Robustness Check - Endogeneity In Branches Where The Officers Are Transferred
In the main paper, we demonstrate that the transfer was indeed random (Table 3).
Nevertheless, even if the transfer policy is random, it may be possible that officers in underperforming branches are more likely to be transferred to higher-performing branches or branches
faced with better market conditions. If so, transferred officers may face a more profitable
customer base in a new branch; thus, her new loans might perform better, and this may have
nothing to do with the elimination of adverse selection due to private information. To address
this concern, we include branch fixed effects and re-estimate coefficients in equations (1) and
(2).
Tables WA4 and WA5 show that our main results remain robust with branch fixed effects.
Model 1 shows the estimates from Tables 4 and 5 in the main paper without branch fixed effects
for comparison. For the acquisition stage regression reported in Table WA5, we continue to find
evidence of adverse selection due to acquisition incentives and moderation of adverse selection
due to maintenance incentives. The incentive states have smaller effect on IRR in Model 2 than
in Model 1, since now the effect of branch-level market conditions (i.e., overall quality of
customer base in a branch) on loan performance is controlled. Even including brand fixed
effects, the coefficient of Transferjo remains positive, showing that transfers reduce adverse
selection — transferred officers bring in higher quality loans than do continuing officers, even
conditional on branch-level unobserved heterogeneity.
Table WA5 documents salespeople’s monitoring behavior within a branch. While the
main loan default effects of incentives remain robust, the maintenance incentive effects are
smaller with branch fixed effects, for both good and bad loans. In Model 2, the effect of transfer
is insignificant for good loans, and slightly positive for bad loans, indicating that transferred
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salespeople without private information are not very effective in monitoring existing loans,
particularly bad loans.
[Insert Tables WA4 and WA5 here]
Robustness Check - Endogeneity in Loan Terms
In our main specification, we treated loan terms as exogenous. A salesperson, however, may
adjust loan terms (amount and maturity) using her private information. In order to address this
concern, we redo the analysis, by using instruments for loan amount and loan duration to account
for potential endogeneity. Recall that the interest rate is set by the bank as a function of the credit
rating.
We use the average loan characteristics of other loans acquired by the same loan officer j at
period o as instruments for loan characteristics. Our rationale for the instruments is as follows:
The average loan terms of a loan officer conditional on their observed loan rating in any given
period reflect both the general style of the loan officer and his/her incentive based motivations in
that period in offering loan terms. These factors are thus independent of any private information
that the salesperson has on the customer and thus its impact on ex-post profitability and therefore
is a valid instrument. Table WA6 shows that our instruments have sufficiently large F-values and
are correlated with endogenous variables in the first stage.
We report the results of the IRR regression with instruments in Table WA7. Interestingly,
the effects of the main variables of interest, Acquisition, Maintenance and Transfers on IRR
remain the same, but now the adverse selection effects have larger magnitudes and the
maintenance pressure and transfer effects have smaller magnitudes. First, this shows that there is
indeed endogeneity of loan terms. Further, it shows that the endogeneity of loan terms attenuate
the effects of acquisition incentives and strengthens the effects of maintenance pressure and
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transfers on IRR. Further, we find a reversal of signs for the terms loan amount and duration in
Model 2. Specifically, we find that larger loans have lower IRR and larger duration loans have
lower IRR. This suggests that salespeople offer larger loan amounts and longer duration loans to
consumers about whom they have negative private information, conditional on other observed
characteristics.
[Insert Table WA7 here]
We assess robustness based on an additional instrument for loan amounts and duration
based on the loan amount and duration offered by the same salesperson to other customers with
the same credit rating as the current customer. While this is more closely related as an instrument
given that we additionally condition on customer observables, the challenge is that the number of
such matched loans by customer types and salesperson tends to be often very few. In our setting,
there are about 42 loans on average served by the same officer in the same month, but only about
24 loans on overage with the same credit rating and served by the same officer in the same
month.
Nevertheless, the results remain qualitatively robust as seen in Table WA8. The F-value
confirms that the instruments work well. We still find the adverse selection when a salesperson
acquires more customers, and is a continuing officer in the same branch. The effect of
maintenance pressure (𝐷!,!!! ) has the same positive sign, but becomes insignificant at the 10%
significance level with the duration instrument. We partly attribute this finding to fewer matched
cases.
[Insert Table WA8 here]
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Robustness Check - Interaction between Incentive States and Transfer
In the main text, we find evidence that transferred officers do not have private
information and thus are less likely to engage in adverse selection. In other words, the adverse
selection is expected to go down for transferred salespeople, if we include the interaction
between Transfer dummy and Acquisition performance and observables. We report the results of
such a specification in Table WA9. We find all main findings remain consistent: a salesperson
engages in adverse selection due to acquisition incentive, the effect is moderated due to
maintenance pressure, and the transfer to a new branch induces a salesperson to acquire higher
quality borrowers. The positive coefficient of the interaction between acquisition incentive and
transfer dummy tells us that the adverse selection due to acquisition incentive goes down for
transferred salespeople. This is consistent with our theory and expectation that customer adverse
selection will be greater for continuing salespeople who have more private information about
customers.
[Insert Table WA9 here]
Robustness Check - Salesperson Learning
We test additional specifications to rule out the explanation that a salesperson learns
about how to increase IRR of customers over time in general. In Table WA10, we examine the
effect of the dummy variable indicating the acquisition increases in column 1, and split the data
based on whether the acquisition increases or not in columns 2 and 3. In Table WA11, the model
controls for each salesperson’s tenure (i.e. years since he/she joined the institution). We still find
that a salesperson is more likely to engage in adverse selection when her acquisition performance
goes up, mainly when 𝐴!" is positive in column 2 of Table WA10. Other variables in interest
show consistent results. The adverse selection is mitigated under higher maintenance pressure
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and the transferred officers are more likely to accept safer loans. In Table WA11, the positive
coefficient of Tenure variable shows that the experience at the bank helps the salesperson acquire
better quality customers.
[Insert Tables WA10 and WA11 here]
Further, a salesperson might learn about customers in a particular region over time after moving
to a new branch, and the increase in information affects loans’ profitability. We examine if any
change in a salesperson’s private information about a region drives our qualitative result on IRR.
We measure how many quarters have passed since transfer (i.e. since a salesperson started to
work in a new branch) and interact the term with Incentive states, Transfer states and
Salesperson fixed effects. In Table WA12, the most variables in interest are in effect. The table
below shows that most variables in interest are still in effect. The first column interacts the
quarter FE with Incentive states, the second column interacts the quarter FE with Incentives
states and Transfer states, and the third column interacts the quarter FE with Salesperson FE to
accommodate time-varying unobserved heterogeneity across salespeople.
[Insert Table WA12 here]
We interpret these results as follows. While is possible for a salesperson to improve his/her
ability to increase IRR as they learn about a region (greater efficiency), private information can
lead to losses in IRR as salesperson brings in easy to acquire low type consumers, conditional on
observables. We define private information as any information about customer profitability
beyond credit rating or the firm’s observables. If a salesperson learns about how to increase IRR
of general customers or customers in a particular region, but still engages in adverse selection, it
strengthens our argument that private information induces salespeople to acquire lower-quality
customers.
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Acquisition Target Ratcheting
In Table A.1 of the appendix, we describe how the bank sets its acquisition targets. As can
be seen, in the quota schedule, a larger starting portfolio can lead to larger acquisition targets,
with discrete jumps above discrete thresholds. One may wonder whether our results are robust to
ratcheting effects.
Observe that ratcheting incentives will not change our qualitative conclusions. The
ratcheting effect leads to a perverse incentive for a salesperson who has just met current
acquisition targets to not exceed the threshold, so as not to have a higher target the following
month. This means that in the face of ratcheting incentives, adverse selection incentive is
marginally mitigated. In other words, our measured estimate of adverse selection in response to
acquisition incentives is a lower bound.
Previous empirical literature on salesforce compensation has highlighted the adverse
consequences of ratcheting incentive that induces workers to withhold effort to avoid larger
future quotas (e.g., Anderson, Dekker and Sedatole 2010; Misra and Nair 2011). Our results shed
new light on the another effect of ratcheting by alleviating customer adverse selection;
disciplining salespeople to avoid the abuse of asymmetric information for short-term
compensation at the expense of the firm. This effect may be a rationale for the use of target in
practice (e.g., Leone and Rock 2002; Weitzman 1980).
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Table WA1. Randomness of Transfer Policy

DV
𝑀!!!
Time since Last Transfer
𝑀!!! * Time since Last Transfer

Model 1

Model 2

𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑓𝑒𝑟!

𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑓𝑒𝑟!

-0.0480
(0.203)
-0.0116
(0.0146)
0.0157
(0.0159

Average Loan Amount
Intercept
Period FE
N
***

0.0405
(0.0716)
Yes
659
: p<0.01, **: p<0.05, *: p<0.1

0.0384
(0.0357)
-0.0122
(0.0164)
Yes
3,448

61

Table WA2. Internal Rate of Return (IRR) of Newly Originated Loans with a new definition of
the Transfer dummy
DV
𝐴!"   
𝐷!,!!!
𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑓𝑒𝑟!"
Intercept

IRR
-0.504***
(0.152)
1.129**
(0.538)
0.00570
(0.193)
-9.196***
(1.227)

Loan
Yes
Characteristics
Salesperson, Period FE
Yes
N
89,993
***
: p<0.01, **: p<0.05, *: p<0.1
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Table WA3. Delinquency of Existing Loans with a new definition of the Transfer dummy
DV
𝐷!,!!!
𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑓𝑒𝑟!"
𝐵𝑎𝑑!,!!!
𝐵𝑎𝑑!,!!! ∗ 𝐷!,!!!
𝐵𝑎𝑑!,!!! ∗ 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑓𝑒𝑟!"
𝐴!"
𝐵𝑎𝑑!,!!! ∗ 𝐴!"
Intercept

Model 1
Delay
-0.0202***
(0.00764)
0.00541**
(0.00214)
0.469***
(0.00205)
0.0943***
(0.0128)
0.00516
(0.00318)
-0.00453**
(0.00178)
0.00111
(0.00321)
0.126***
(0.0112)

Loan Characteristics
Yes
Salesperson, Period FE
Yes
N
278,943
***
**
*
: p<0.01, : p<0.05, : p<0.1
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Table WA4: IRR of New Loans with Branch FE
Model 1*
Model 2
DV
IRR
IRR
-0.537***
-0.396**
𝐴!"   
(0.152)
(0.158)
1.070**
0.969*
𝐷!,!!!
(0.538)
(0.572)
1.987***
2.177***
𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑓𝑒𝑟!"
(0.216)
(0.230)
3.991***
3.863***
Rating 2
(0.598)
(0.609)
13.33***
13.02***
Rating 3
(0.476)
(0.484)
21.74***
21.23***
Rating 4
(0.420)
(0.427)
26.66***
26.09***
Rating 5
(0.404)
(0.411)
0.630***
0.619***
Loan Amount
(0.0790)
(0.0800)
-0.108***
-0.0923***
Duration
(0.0202)
(0.0205)
0.657***
0.662***
Interest Rate
(0.00703)
(0.00711)
-10.95***
-8.615***
Intercept
(1.231)
(2.593)
Salesperson FE
Yes
Yes
Period FE
Yes
Yes
Branch FE
No
Yes
N
89,993
86,886
***
: p<0.01, **: p<0.05, *: p<0.1
*Note that we show the result of Model 1 in Table 4 in the first column.
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Table WA5: Delinquency of Existing Loans with Branch FE
Model 1*
Model 2
Delinquency
Delinquency
-0.0203***
-0.0193**
𝐷!,!!!
(0.00764)
(0.00789)
0.00442*
-0.00454
𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑓𝑒𝑟!"
(0.00257)
(0.00425)
0.470***
0.470***
𝐵𝑎𝑑!,!!!
(0.00198)
(0.00197)
0.0957***
0.0888***
𝐵𝑎𝑑!,!!! ∗ 𝐷!,!!!
(0.0128)
(0.0132)
-0.00376
0.0229***
𝐵𝑎𝑑!,!!! ∗ 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑓𝑒𝑟!"
(0.00390)
(0.00674)
-0.00440**
-0.00503***
𝐴!"
(0.00178)
(0.00182)
0.000994
0.00288
𝐵𝑎𝑑!,!!! ∗ 𝐴!"
(0.00321)
(0.00334)
-0.00468
-0.00554
Rating 2
(0.00415)
(0.00418)
-0.0720***
-0.0730***
Rating 3
(0.00351)
(0.00354)
-0.165***
-0.166***
Rating 4
(0.00315)
(0.00317)
-0.253***
-0.255***
Rating 5
(0.00301)
(0.00303)
-0.00483***
-0.00478***
Loan Amount
(0.000718)
(0.000725)
0.00163***
0.00159***
Duration
(0.000180)
(0.000181)
0.00212***
0.00213***
Interest Rate
(0.0000686)
(0.0000692)
0.0113***
0.0111***
Age of Loan
(0.000299)
(0.000301)
0.126***
0.181***
Intercept
(0.0112)
(0.0509)
Salesperson, Period FE
Yes
Yes
Branch FE
No
Yes
N
278,943
274,907
***
: p<0.01, **: p<0.05, *: p<0.1
*Note that we show the result of Model 2 in Table 4 in the first column.
DV
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Table WA6: Instrumental Variable Regression - First Stage
DV
𝐴!"   
𝐷!,!!!
𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑓𝑒𝑟!"
Loan Amount
Duration
Intercept

Amount IV
0.013**
(0.006)
-0.041*
(0.022)
0.002
(0.008)
0.27***
(0.012)
0.12***
(0.00075)
0.051
(0.033)

Duration IV
0.082***
(0.025)
0.034
(0.089)
0.0997***
(0.0357)
1.86***
(0.011)
0.144***
(0.012)
4.10***
(0.213)

Loan
Yes
Yes
Characteristics
No
Yes
Salesperson FE
Period FE
Yes
Yes
F-value
1474.87
130.78
N
89,860
89,860
***
: p<0.01, **: p<0.05, *: p<0.1
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Table WA7. IRR of Newly Originated Loans with Instrumental Variables
Model 1
Model 2
DV
IRR(IV)
IRR (IV)
Instrument
Average
Average
Variable
Amount
Duration
-0.647***
-0.705***
𝐴!"   
(0.149)
(0.167)
0.876*
0.984*
𝐷!,!!!
(0.528)
(0.567)
1.901***
1.795***
𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑓𝑒𝑟!"
(0.189)
(0.232)
3.990***
5.473***
Rating 2
(0.670)
(0.735)
13.27***
18.48***
Rating 3
(0.719)
(1.445)
21.6***
29.81***
Rating 4
(0.779)
(2.191)
26.5***
34.83***
Rating 5
(0.816)
(2.213)
1.136
-2.962***
Loan Amount
(1.038)
(0.967)
-0.179
1.820***
Duration
(0.127)
(0.518)
0.652***
0.598***
Interest Rate
(0.0133)
(0.0176)
-11.55***
-20.42***
Intercept
(0.810)
(2.839)
No
Yes
Salesperson FE
Period FE
Yes
Yes
N
89,860
89,860
***
: p<0.01, **: p<0.05, *: p<0.1
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Table WA8. IRR of Newly Originated Loans with new Instrumental Variables
DV
Instrument
Variable
𝐴!"   
𝐷!,!!!
𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑓𝑒𝑟!"
Intercept

IRR (IV)
Average
Amount
-1.095***
(0.257)
1.555**
(0.722)
1.703***
(0.284)
-17.65***
(1.865)

IRR (IV)
Average
Duration
-0.655***
(0.160)
0.848
(0.568)
1.689***
(0.227)
-23.96***
(1.842)

Loan
Yes
Yes
Characteristics
Yes
Yes
Salesperson FE
Period FE
Yes
Yes
First Stage F78.11
127.45
value
N
89,860
89,860
***
: p<0.01, **: p<0.05, *: p<0.1
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Table WA9. IRR of New Loans with Interaction between Transfer and Incentive States
DV
𝐴!"
𝐴!" ∗ 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑓𝑒𝑟!"   
𝐷!,!!!
𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑓𝑒𝑟!"
Intercept

Model 1
IRR
-0.717***
(0.168)
0.986***
(0.379)
0.901*
(0.535)
18.23***
(1.563)
-13.91***
(1.267)

Loan Characteristics and
Yes
Interactions with 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑓𝑒𝑟!"
Salesperson, Period FE
Yes
N
89,993
***
: p<0.01, **: p<0.05, *: p<0.1
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Table WA10. IRR of Newly Originated Loans (Learning)
DV

IRR

IRR
Positive 𝐴!"
-1.285**
(0.544)

IRR
Negative 𝐴!"
0.287
(0.334)

-0.514***
(0.134)
1.076**
(0.537)
1.99***
(0.216)
-10.60***
(1.231)

1.936**
(0.810)
3.018***
(0.352)
-9.56***
(1.851)

1.029*
(0.557)
1.554***
(0.293)
-10.96***
(1.637)

Yes

Yes

Yes

𝐴!"
Positive 𝐴!"   
𝐷!,!!!
𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑓𝑒𝑟!"
Intercept
Loan
Characteristics
Salesperson FE
Period FE
N

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
89,993
49,489
***
**
: p<0.01, : p<0.05, *: p<0.1

No
No
40,504
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Table WA11. IRR of Newly Originated Loans (Learning)
DV
𝐴!"   
𝐷!,!!!
𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑓𝑒𝑟!"
Tenure
Intercept

IRR
-0.44***
(0.157)
1.029*
(0.557)
1.942***
(0.226)
22.50***
(0.362)
-251.6***
(4.249)

Loan
Yes
Characteristics
Yes
Salesperson FE
Period FE
Yes
N
84,152
***
: p<0.01, **: p<0.05, *: p<0.1
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Table WA12. IRR of Newly Originated Loans (Learning about a region)
DV
𝐴!"
𝐴!" * (Quarter = 2)
𝐴!" * (Quarter > 2)
𝐷!,!!!
𝐷!,!!! * (Quarter = 2)
𝐷!,!!! * (Quarter > 2)
𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑓𝑒𝑟!"

IRR
-0.321
(0.255)
-0.684*
(0.404)
-0.107
(0.338)
3.439***
(0.880)
-4.799***
(1.459)
-3.204**
(1.311)
2.025***
(0.217)

-11.06***
(1.233)
Yes
Yes
Yes

IRR
-0.323
(0.255)
-0.574
(0.407)
-0.0920
(0.339)
3.391***
(0.880)
-4.766***
(1.460)
-3.219**
(1.311)
3.157***
(0.580)
1.061***
(0.234)
1.234***
(0.231)
-0.518
(0.579)
-0.791
(1.064)
-11.84***
(1.242)
Yes
Yes
Yes

-13.53***
(2.464)
Yes
No
No

No

No

Yes

(𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑓𝑒𝑟!" = 0) *
(Quarter = 2)
(𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑓𝑒𝑟!" = 0) *
(Quarter > 2)
(𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑓𝑒𝑟!" = 1) *
(Quarter = 2)
(𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑓𝑒𝑟!" = 1) *
(Quarter > 2)
Intercept
Loan Characteristics
Salesperson FE
Period FE
Salesperson FE *
Quarter FE
N

***

89,993
89,993
: p<0.01, **: p<0.05, *: p<0.1

IRR
-0.295*
(0.173)

0.986
(0.638)

2.328***
(0.243)

89,993

